




 The Philosophy of Language seeks ultimately to address two questions: What are the  linguistic  facts, and in particular the facts that determine what may be said on occasion by the use of language? And how are speakers in a position to exploit those  facts?  In  a  slogan,  the  first  question  requests  a  theory  of  meaning,  the second  a  theory  of  understanding.  As Michael  Dummett  has  long  advocated,  a theory of meaning must engage properly with a theory of understanding so that the  two  questions  ultimately  receive  an  integrated  answer.2  However, historically, the second question has been recessive. My brief in this paper is to make a mild plea in its favour, through a preliminary exploration of some issues that arise when it is brought to prominence.   In  the background  are  some  large questions  about  the proper division of labour between the theory of meaning and the theory of understanding. Should we  view  linguistic  understanding  as  a  form  of  propositional  knowledge  of independently discernible meaning facts? Or is meaning more intimately related to understanding  than  that picture would  require,  so  that  facts  about meaning are  partly  absorbed  into,  and  so  only  accessible  through,  a  theory  of understanding?  Indeed,  is  there  even  a  separable  question  for  the  theory  of meaning  to  address,  or  is  understanding  an  achievement  that  makes  no independently  specifiable demands upon  the  facts?3 These are  large questions, and I shall not attempt to foreground them here. But it is important to recognise that a satisfactory answer to our opening questions must engage with them.   I  shall  begin  in  §2  by  distinguishing  some  varieties  of  understanding.  §3 sketches an argument against the view that propositional knowledge suffices for 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understanding.  The  aim  is  not  simply  to  support  that  conclusion,  but  also  to suggest  that  understanding  is  distinguished  from  other  forms  of  epistemic standing by its dependence upon a specific form of integration of other types of epistemic  standing.  §4  marks  a  further  distinction,  between  what  I  shall  call 
intake  and  uptake.  §5  discusses  the  prospects  of  two  accounts  of  uptake,  and suggests  some desiderata  on  a  unified  account  of  intake  and uptake.  It  is  here that  the  large  issues mentioned above  loom closest  to the surface. To reiterate, my aim here is not to provide detailed arguments for or against specific positions or  desiderata,  but  rather  to  outline  some  central  issues  and  to  indicate  some topics that I think are worthy of further reflection.  
2. Some varieties of understanding. 
 Dummett distinguishes two senses of the verb ‘to understand’:   …that  in  which  someone  is  said  to  understand  a  word,  phrase  or  sentence, considered as a type, and that in which he may be said to understand a particular utterance. We may call  these  the  ‘dispositional’  and  the  ‘occurrent’  senses of  “to understand”. (Dummett, 1993: 58)  Why  is  there  a  need  to  mark  (or  to  keep  track  of)  this  distinction?  Dummett offers two sorts of reasons. The first adverts to a distinction putatively amongst the objects of understanding. The second adverts to a distinction amongst modes of understanding.   We  need  an  occurrent  sense  of  “understand”  for  two  reasons:  indexicality  and ambiguity….  If,  for example,  I hear  someone say  “There  is a  sinister  smell here”, how much do I need to know about where he is to know what statement he was making or what thought he was expressing, in that sense under which, if true, it is true  absolutely?  If  someone  utters  an  ambiguous  sentence,  his  hearers  may understand  it  in a particular way, whether as he  intended or not; we may speak also, not only of how  the speaker meant  it, but of how he was understanding  it. (1993: 60) 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This  first  reason  resides with  a  distinction between what  a  type  of  expression 
means—what the standing meaning of the expression type is—and what is said by  the  use  of  that  expression—what  thought  is  expressed  by  the  use  of  the expression on an occasion. The second reason resides with a distinction between possession  of  a  capacity  to  understand  expression  types  or  utterances  and proper exercise of that capacity on particular occasions. Dummett focuses upon the  latter  reason  in  response  to  what  he  takes  to  be Wittgenstein’s  refusal  to acknowledge occurrent understanding:   …it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  can  be  maintained  that  no  occurrent  notion  of understanding is required: for it is possible to be perplexed by a sentence on first hearing, through a failure to take in its structure, and to attain an understanding of it on reflection. (1993: 103)4  When the two types of reason are distinguished, the need for an at least four‐way distinction  emerges:  (i)  dispositional  understanding  of  standing  meaning;  (ii) occurrent understanding of standing meaning;  (iii) dispositional understanding of what is said in particular utterances; and (iv) occurrent understanding of what is said.    To  see  the  need  for  (i)–(iv),  consider  attending  to  an  utterance  of  the sentence type in (1):   (1) He is too intelligent to expect us to beat.  A  typical  response  to  an  utterance  of  (1)  would  be  blank  incomprehension: absence  of  occurrent  understanding  even  of  the  standing  meaning  of  the sentence  type  employed.  On  reflection,  however,  one  is  able  to  ‘take  in  its structure,  and  to  attain  understanding’.  To  a  good  first  approximation,  the standing meaning of (1) is given in (2):   (2)  A  contextually  determined male  is  too  intelligent  for  one  to  expect  a contextually  specified  group  including  the  speaker  to  beat  the contextually determined male. 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Understanding what someone has said,  in  the occurrent sense, ordinarily helps to  put  one  in  a  position  to  know  that  someone  has  produced  a  particular utterance  and  thereby  said,  with  one  or  another  type  of  force,  that  such‐and‐such. For instance, understanding what someone, say Florence, has said by use of (1), where the speaker used ‘he’ to refer to the World Chess Champion for 2008, might help to put one in a position to know that (3) or that (4):   (3)  Florence  produced  an  utterance  of  (1)  and  thereby  asserted  that Viswanathan  is  too  intelligent  for  one  to  expect  us  to  beat  him (Viswanathan).  (4)  Florence  produced  an  utterance  of  (1)  and  thereby  asked  whether Viswanathan  is  too  intelligent  for  one  to  expect  us  to  beat  him (Viswanathan).  The thin use of saying involved here can be understood as a sort of determinable of  each of  the determinate  forces with which  an utterance  can be produced.  It corresponds with what one might know if one knew that Florence had expressed the thought that Viswanathan is disqualified but did not know whether she had asserted  that  Viswanathan  is  disqualified,  asked  whether  he  is,  ordered,  or optated  that he be.  I  shall  ignore  issues arising  from our grasp of  the  forces of utterances and  focus on our engagement with  facts  like  that stated  in (5), with ‘said’ understood in the thin way.   (5)  Florence  produced  an  utterance  of  (1)  and  thereby  said  that Viswanathan  is  too  intelligent  for  one  to  expect  us  to  beat  him (Viswanathan).  In  what,  then,  does  one’s  understanding  of  Florence’s  utterance  consist?  An immediate hypothesis  is  that one’s understanding  is one’s knowing  that  (5), or 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something similar. The immediate hypothesis has the advantage that it involves only  minimal  departure  from what  would  ordinarily  be  the  case  were  one  to understand Florence’s utterance. But it suffers from numerous disadvantages.   The hypothesis can be understood in at  least  three ways. First,  it can be understood as embodying the claim that one’s understanding of an utterance is a 
simple matter of one’s knowing what was said in that utterance and so is neutral with  respect  to  any  more  specific  account  of  how  one  knows  what  was  said. Second, it can be understood as embodying the claim that one’s understanding of an utterance is a brutal matter of one’s knowing what was said in that utterance and so requires  that  there  is no more specific account of how one knows what was  said.  Third,  it  can  be  understood  as  embodying  the  claim  that  one’s understanding  of  an  utterance  is  an  unspecified  matter  of  one’s  knowing  in  a particular way what was said.    The unspecified understanding of  the hypothesis, with  its uncomfortable conjunction of acceptance of the possibility of  further specification with refusal to  supply  it,  can  be  rejected  immediately  in  the  present  context.  Reasons  for rejecting  the simple  and brutal understandings are a  little  less  straightforward. To a first approximation, both should be rejected due to their respective failures appropriately  to  distinguish  understanding  from  other  forms  or  ways  of knowing, either  through  failing  to mark understanding off  from other  forms or ways of knowing, or through marking understanding off in a way that renders its standing mysterious.  I  shall  begin  to  explain  those  failings  by  considering  the hypothesis that understanding is a simple matter of knowing what was said.   Seeing things can put one in a position to have propositional knowledge about those things. And we think of seeing things as a specific way in which one can be put  in a position  to know about  those  things, a way distinct  from being put in a position to know through understanding. The point is not (yet) that an account of understanding must underwrite special  treatment of understanding; but rather, that the account of understanding must not disrupt special treatment of other cases. Yet the simple understanding of the hypothesis is consistent with cases  of  knowledge  through  sensory  perception—for  instance,  seeing  that  the game  has  begun  or  hearing  that  the  clock  has  stopped—also  being  cases  of understanding.  Hence,  the  simple  understanding  of  the  hypothesis  fails 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appropriately  to  distinguish  understanding  from  other ways we  have  of  being (or coming to be) in a position to know.   One response at this point would be to reject the complaint as premised on a failure to exploit all of the resources available to the defender of the simple hypothesis. The hypothesis is, not simply that understanding of an utterance may be any form of propositional knowledge about it, but also, more specifically, that it is a matter of being in a position to have propositional knowledge of what was said  in  the  utterance.  And,  the  response  continues,  the  special  nature  of  the objects of understanding, that they are facts concerning what was said, forces the required distinction amongst our ways of being put in a position to know. For the involvement  of  what  is  not  sense  perceptible—i.e.  content—in  what  was  said means that one cannot in other specific ways—i.e. by seeing, hearing, etc.—come by knowledge concerning what was said. As Tyler Burge puts it,   We  do  not  perceive  the  contents  of  attitudes  that  are  conveyed  to  us;  we understand  them.  We  perceive  and  have  perceptual  beliefs  about  word occurrences.  We  may  perceive  them  as  having  a  certain  content  and  subject matter, but the content is understood, not perceived. (Burge, 1993: 478)  There  is  room  for discussion at  this point  concerning  the understanding of  the bounds  of  the  (sense‐)  perceptible  required  by  the  envisaged  defence  of  the 
simple understanding of the hypothesis. In particular, those who wish to employ the defence and who also wish to endorse a view of sense perceptions as bearers of  propositional  content  will  have  work  to  do  in  ensuring  a  difference  in  the modes  of  engagement with  content  involved  in  perception  and  understanding that would make appropriate Burge’s differential attitude. And it is not obvious that  making  out  the  required  distinction  would  not  require  going  beyond  the 
simple hypothesis. But a more immediate problem with the envisaged defence of the simple hypothesis is that, rather than evading the need further to specify the nature  of  understanding,  it  positively  invites  further  specification.  For  the distinction with  sense  perception  relies,  not  upon  the  impossibility  of  sensory engagement  with  content,  but  rather  upon  the  impossibility  of  engagement 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through  understanding with  the  proper  objects  of  sense.  And making  out  that impossibility would seem to require a substantive account of understanding.   The  brutal  understanding  of  the  hypothesis  has  the  resources  to distinguish understanding from knowledge got through sense perception. On its 
brutal understanding, the hypothesis provides a negative specification of the way of coming to know characteristic of understanding, according  to which  there  is no more specific characterisation of the way of coming to know that constitutes understanding. On this view, what distinguishes being in a position to know on the basis of seeing, hearing, etc., from being in a position to know as a matter of understanding  is  that  in  the  former  cases,  by  contrast  with  the  latter,  it  is possible further to specify the way in which one knows. By contrast with cases of knowledge got through seeing, hearing, etc., a complete answer to the question, how  one  knows  what  was  said  in  that  utterance—where  the  question presupposes that we have an exhaustive answer to all sub‐questions pertaining to perceptual sources, for instance the question of how you were in a position to know about that utterance rather than this one—might be: ‘One just does’.   Although  it  is  plausible  that  the  brutal  hypothesis  can  underwrite  a distinction  between  understanding  and  sense‐perceptual  sources  of  epistemic position,  it appears unable to register a distinction between understanding and other  sources.  At  least  that  is  so  on  the  plausible  view  that with  respect  to  at least  certain  basic  pieces  of  one’s  a  priori  knowledge,  there  is  no  articulate answer to the question of how one knows them.10 On that view of basic a priori knowledge, the brutal hypothesis fails to acknowledge a genuine distinction, by classifying  understanding  together  with  any  way  of  having  non‐perceptual knowledge—or,  at  least, with  all ways  of  having  such knowledge  for which no articulate  characterisation  is  available.  And  the  immediate  corollary  of  that failure  is  apt  to  appear  even  more  pressing.  By  classifying  understanding together  with  basic  a  priori  knowledge,  it  treats  understanding  as  a  way  of having such knowledge. And that will seem to many to count decisively against the hypothesis.   The  consequence  will  seem  decisive  against  the  brutal  hypothesis  to many theorists, though not to all. For one prominent example, Burge is rendered immune  to  the  present  charge  because  he  anyway holds  that,  in  at  least  some 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cases,  our  knowledge of what was  said  is a priori. More  carefully,  Burge holds that, if we hive off the distinctive contribution of sense‐perception in coming to know what was  said,  by  viewing  it  as  a mere  trigger  to  the  operations  of  the intellectual  faculty  involved  in  appropriately  entertaining  the  content  of  what was said, then we can view the source of our knowledge as the proper operation of  the  intellectual  faculty  itself.  And  it  is  reasonable  in  that  case  to  group knowledge gained via understanding together with other cases of knowledge got by intellection, and so to view understanding as a source of, or way of having, a 
priori knowledge.11   I’ve argued elsewhere that Burge’s view of understanding should not be accepted, at  least  in  full generality, and that  it should be rejected,  in particular, for a range of core cases in which understanding puts one in a position to acquire knowledge  from an  interlocutor. The basic difficulty  it  faces  is  that,  in  the core cases,  understanding  is  implicated  in making  available,  not  only  an  expressed content, but also its having been expressed through an episode of the production of speech by a particular agent. It is this function of understanding that puts one in  a  position  to  know who  said what  and  to  know  vicariously  on  the  basis  of testimony obtained from particular sources. That function, I’ve argued, requires the integrated exercise of intellectual faculties and sense perceptual faculties so that  the  form  of  understanding  involved  does  not  in  any  straightforward way give  rise  to  a  priori  knowledge  of  what  is  said.12  However,  even  if  we  accept Burge’s account, there is a more immediate difficulty. Although Burge’s account is  able  to  underwrite  the  possibility  of  a  priori  knowledge  got  through understanding,  it  is  unable—at  least  in  the  context  of  brutalism  about  basic a 
priori  knowledge—to  rule  out  the  possibility  that  every  piece  of  basic  a  priori knowledge is got through understanding.   It might be thought that,  if the account of understanding that I proposed in  place  of  Burge’s  is  accepted,  it  might  supply  resources  to  distinguish understanding  from  other  forms  or  ways  of  knowing.  According  to  the alternative view, core cases of understanding are the upshot of, or participate in the  upshot  of,  integrated  operations  of  sense‐perceptual  and  intellectual faculties. On the basis of that account, it might be suggested that what is special about  understanding  is  just  that  it  is  the  upshot  of  both  sense  perception  and 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intellection. Although such an account would go beyond the simple identification of understanding with knowing what was said, it would do so by drawing only on specifications anyway implicated in characterising its component achievements.   Second  thoughts  serve  to  scotch  the  suggestion.  Although  the  proposed account  is  able  to  distinguish  understanding  from  the  upshots  of  sense perception or intellection, it is unable, without supplementation, to distinguish it from  other  cases  of  knowledge  got  through  both.  For  one  example,  it  appears unable,  absent  supplementation,  to  distinguish  understanding  from  ordinary cases  of  knowing  on  the  basis  of  sense  perception,  where  this  involves  the application of  concepts—so  intellection—to  the deliverances of  the senses. For another  example,  it  appears  unable,  without  further  ado,  to  distinguish understanding  from  a  posteriori  knowledge  of  necessities,  where  such knowledge is the upshot of integrated operations—in typical cases, inferentially integrated operations—of intellection and perception.   The  discussion  to  this  point  has  been  premised  on  the  assumption  that basic  a  priori  knowledge  is  not  subject  to  further  specification.  Perhaps  that assumption  is  the  villain.  Let’s  suppose,  then,  that  basic  a  priori  knowledge  is subject to further specification—perhaps, for example, as knowledge got through intellection  or  reflection.  Obviously,  the  supposition  is  subject  to  its  own explanatory demands, in particular the demand for an account of the powers of intellection  and  reflection.  But  even  supposing  those  demands  discharged,  the consequent  account  of a  priori knowledge would  be  unable  to  save  the brutal hypothesis.  Understanding  would  be  not  only  special,  by  virtue  of  its  simple distinction from other forms or ways of knowing, but also an oddity, by virtue of the manner of that distinction. It would be the only form or way of knowing not subject  to  further  specification.  And  the  mystery  occasioned  by  that  special standing  is  deepened  by  the  observation  that  it  would  be  a  brutal  way  of knowing time‐bound contingencies, e.g. concerning who said what, and when. By far  the  most  natural  view  at  this  point  is  that  no  obvious  version  of  the hypothesis that understanding of an utterance is knowledge of what was said in that utterance should be accepted. Rather,  if understanding is a  form or way of knowing, then it is a specific form or way of knowing. 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 The  conclusion  to  this  point  is  supported  by  an  observation  of Christopher  Peacocke’s.  Peacocke  observes  that  it  is  possible  to  know  what someone  has  said  in  a  particular  utterance  without  understanding  their utterance. For instance, someone in the know might tell you that, in producing a particular  utterance,  Florence  said  that  Viswanathan  is  disqualified.  Supposing appropriate  conditions  are met,  it  is  possible  to  acquire  knowledge  from  such testimony.  Hence,  one  might  acquire  knowledge  that  Florence  said  that Viswanathan is disqualified on the basis of testimony, so independently of one’s understanding  Florence’s  utterance  to  that  effect.13  A  similar  result  can  be achieved by considering the difference between merely coming to know, through being  told,  that  an utterance of  (1)  says  that  (2)  and  coming,  perhaps  through engagement with  (2),  simply  to  understand  an  utterance  of  (1).  In  addition  to supplying immediate support to the conclusion that understanding is not simply knowledge of what was said, Peacocke’s observation bolsters an intervening step in  the  argument.  For  it  indicates  that  understanding  is  not  distinguished  from other  forms  of  knowledge  simply  by  virtue  of  being  knowledge  specifically  of what was said. And it suggests that if understanding is a form or way of knowing what was said, then it is a peculiarly immediate form or way.  
4. Intake and uptake.  A natural hypothesis at this point would be that understanding is a specific form of  propositional  knowledge,  or  a  determinate way  of  having  the  determinable, propositional  knowledge,  akin  to  other  specific  forms,  or  ways  of  having, propositional knowledge,  e.g.  seeing  that  such‐and‐such and  remembering  that such‐and‐such. However, pursuit of the comparison with other specific forms, or ways, of knowing suggests an alternative hypothesis.   Consider  seeing  that  the  game  has  started.  If  we  accept  that  this  is  a specific form, or way, of knowing that the game has started—in particular, that it is a different form, or way, of knowing from hearing that, or remembering that, the game has started—then it is pressing to say in what its specificity lies. And an obvious  answer would  be  that  seeing  that  the  game has  started  is  a matter  of knowing,  by  seeing,  that  the  game  has  started.14  By  parity,  then,  one  would 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naturally predict that, if understanding is a specific form of knowing, then it is a matter of knowing by understanding. And if one understood the characterisation of the specific forms of knowing involved here as going via appeal to an episodic basis  for  the  acquisition  of  knowledge—for  example,  an  episode  of  seeing  the game  start,  or  of  understanding  Florence’s  utterance—then  it  might  appear natural  to  view  the  understanding  of  an  utterance,  not  as  the  output  of  an epistemic achievement, but rather as its episodic input.   The  suggested  understanding  of  the  structure  of  specific  forms  of knowledge  is  not  immediately  forced.  For  one might  view  the  ‘know  by φ‐ing’ specification  as  indicating  involvement  of  a  specific  epistemic  capacity,  rather than  specific  input  to  a  general  epistemic  capacity.  For  present  purposes,  we needn’t attempt to decide the issue between the two understandings, for there is reason to think that, whatever its precise role in determining epistemic standing, exercises  of  dispositional  understanding  can  leave  a  mark  in  consciousness independent  of  the  achievement  of  epistemic  standing.  And  it  would  then  be natural to view those episodes as cases of understanding.   A reason to think that exercises of dispositional understanding can make a psychological difference independent of the achievement of epistemic standing is provided by the possibility of rational withholding of belief about what is said consistent  with  exercise  of  understanding  otherwise  suitable  to  underwrite knowledge of what is said.15 The structure of the case is similar to an analogous case  for  seeing.  In  that  case, we  begin with  a  situation  in which  one  sees  that such‐and‐such,  for  instance  a  situation  in which  one  sees  that  a  chess  piece  is black. In that situation, one knows by seeing that the chess piece is black. Since knowing  that  the  chess  piece  is  black  entails  believing  that  the  chess  piece  is black—at  least modulo  the  subject’s  rationality and  their ability  to believe  that the chess piece is black—one believes that the chess piece is black. But one might be  in  almost  precisely  the  same  position with  respect  to  one’s  perceptual  and epistemic  standing  towards  the  chess  piece  whilst  withholding  belief  that  the chess piece is black. If one has apparently good reasons for withholding belief—perhaps  one  has,  or  appears  to  have,  good  reason  for  thinking  that  one  is undergoing a brain manipulation that would make only red chess pieces appear black  to  one—then  one’s  withholding  belief  might  be  rationally  permissible. 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Hence, one might rationally withhold belief and,  so,  fail  to know that  the chess piece is black. Plausibly, one might nonetheless see the chess piece, and the chess piece’s  colour.  More  generally,  the  upshot  of  exercise  of  one’s  seeing  capacity might have the same potential to determine one’s epistemic standing as such an upshot  would  have  in  a  healthy  doxastic  environment.  For  instance,  if  the apparent  reason  for  withholding  belief  were  extinguished,  then—ceteris 
paribus—it  is plausible  that one would be  in a position  to know that  the chess piece is black.    In the case of understanding, we can begin with a situation in which one knows on  the basis of understanding  that Florence has  said  that  the  game has started.  In this case,  it appears plausible that one might  in almost precisely the same way  undergo  an  exercise  of  one’s  capacity  to  understand  in  a  context  in which one rationally withholds belief from the proposition that Florence has said that the game has started. One might still take in Florence’s saying that the game has  started  even  if  apparently  reasonable  doubts  about  brain  manipulation prevented one from making epistemic use of what one took  in. More generally, one might be  in a position such  that,  if one’s apparent  reasons  for withholding belief were  extinguished,  then—ceteris  paribus—one would be  in  a position  to know that Florence had said that the game has started.16   I suggested that, given the distinction between the non‐epistemic upshot of exercise of a capacity  to understand and knowledge attained on  the basis of that  exercise,  it  would  be  natural  to  identify  understanding  with  the  upshot rather  than  the knowledge. But  the distinction between upshot and knowledge does not dictate adoption of that position on the location of understanding. Given the  distinction,  a  question  arises  as  to  the  function  of  knowledge—and,  in particular, the belief requirement on knowledge—given that apparently one can take in elements of one’s environment in its absence. And a plausible answer to that  question—an  answer  given  credence by  reflection  on what  is  lacking  in  a subject who mistakenly withholds belief in what they take in—is that knowledge of  a  fact  is  what  allows  one  to  exploit  that  fact—to  have  that  fact  serve  as  a reason for one—in one’s theoretical and practical reasoning. On that view, what is missing, when one withholds what would otherwise be reasonable belief about what one  takes  in,  is a capacity  to have one’s practical and  theoretical position 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controlled  by  how  things  are.17  If  that  is  right,  then  exercises  of  a  capacity  to understand that do not result in knowledge, like exercises of a capacity to see a black  chess  piece’s  colour  that  do  not  result  in  seeing  that  the  chess  piece  is black, might be thought to involve a form of cognitive blindness.18 And we might then rather identify understanding with a specific form of openness to the facts about what has been said, rather than with the type of input that determines its specific form.   Again, we  are  not  required  for  present  purposes  to  take  a  stand on  the precise  location  of  understanding.  We  have  seen  grounds  for  requiring,  of  an account of understanding, that it give accounts both of the episodes by which one takes  in  what  is  said—what  I  shall  refer  to  as  an  account  of  intake understanding—and also of  the  form of openness to what one thereby takes  in that  enables  one  to  exploit  facts  about  what  is  said  in  one’s  theoretical  and practical reasoning—what I shall refer to as an account of uptake understanding. I  shall  turn,  in  the  next  section,  to  the  question  of  the  form  of  uptake understanding, in the hope that addressing that question might provide clues as to the further specification of intake.   
5. Uptake and knowledge of truth­conditions. 
 If  openness  to  what  one  takes  in  through  understanding  is  a  matter  of understanding that such‐and‐such, in the way that openness to what one takes in through seeing is a matter of seeing that such‐and‐such, then it is too amorphous a subject matter to warrant focussed attention. For one can see that a chess piece is  black  without  seeing  the  chess  piece’s  colour,  for  instance  by  seeing  the colours of the other chess pieces in a set. And one can understand that Florence said,  in  a  demonstrated  utterance,  that  the  game  has  started  without understanding an utterance of Florence’s to the effect that the game has started, for  instance  by  understanding  testimony  from  someone  other  than  Florence. What  is required  is a restriction to the epistemic positions one can occupy  just through  exercise  of  one’s  capacity  to  understand.  Put  another  way,  what  is wanted  is  an  account  of  epistemic  standing  that  would  be  (with  appropriate modal qualification) both necessary and sufficient for uptake. 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 The requirement for an account of epistemic standing that would be both necessary and sufficient for uptake has obvious affinities with a requirement of Donald  Davidson’s,  according  to  which  a  theory  of  meaning  for  a  particular language should ‘explicitly state something knowledge of which would suffice for interpreting  utterances  of  speakers  of  the  language  to  which  it  applies’ (Davidson, 1976: 171). There are  two  relevant differences between Davidson’s formulation and ours. First, Davidson seeks an account of facts, or truths, that are exploited  by  those  who  understand  utterances,  rather  than  an  account  of  the way(s)  in  which  those  facts,  or  truths,  are  exploited.  That  provides  sufficient grounds  for  Davidson’s  decision  not  to  join  us  in  requiring  an  account  of knowledge that is necessary for openness to what one understands, grounds that Davidson seeks to bolster through general scepticism concerning the probity of the  more  demanding  aim.19  Second,  and  related,  Davidson  seeks  to  provide sufficient conditions  for being  in a position  to  interpret  (his version of uptake) through  a  statement  of  the  facts,  or  truths,  knowledge  of which would  sustain ability to interpret. By contrast, our formulation leaves open whether Davidson’s aim  is,  in  full  generality,  sustainable,  by  allowing  that  understanding  might depend upon something other than propositional (i.e. stateable) knowledge.20   Davidson’s proposal for meeting his requirement is that knowledge of the output  theorem  of  an  interpretative  truth  theory  that  applies  to  an  utterance, together with  knowledge  that  it  was  a  theorem  of  such  a  truth  theory,  would suffice  for  uptake  of  that  utterance.21  Let’s  begin  by  considering  whether Davidson’s  proposal  can  be  transposed  into  an  answer  to  our  question  about uptake. So understood, it becomes the hypothesis that the knowledge involved in Davidson’s  proposal  is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  uptake.  For  example, uptake of Florence’s utterance of (6) would be a matter of knowing that (7), as the  theorematic  element  of  an  interpretative  truth  theory  covering  Florence’s utterance, u.   (6) Viswanathan will win.  (7) u is true iff Viswanathan will win. 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From the perspective of our requirement, the hypothesis has two main benefits but suffers from at least one critical flaw.   The  first  main  benefit  is  that  the  hypothesis  sustains  an  attractive requirement that I shall call the transparency of understanding. In discussing the logical status of supposition, Dummett notes that it is not logically an imperative for, he observes,   I could, having said, ‘Think of a number’, ask ‘Have you done so yet?’, but it would be a joke if I asked that question having said, ‘Suppose the witness is telling the truth’. (Dummett, 1973: 309)22   As  is  appropriate,  Dummett  doesn’t  explain  the  joke.  One  obvious  source  of humour  is  the  inappropriate  form  of  the  verb.  In  order  for  supposition  to  be something one could do, so something one could be ordered do to, it would need to be able to stand for the outcome of a specified process. And that would require the verb ‘suppose’ to take (distinctive23) progressive form, contrary to fact.24 But a  second  potential  source  is  brought  out  more  clearly  by  the  imperative, ‘Entertain the thought that the witness is telling the truth’.25 The second source is  that  one  can’t  understand  the  order  to  entertain  the  thought,  or  idly  to suppose,  without  complying  thereby  with  its  demand.  The  transparency  of understanding is responsible for the latter effect, whereby one cannot in general understand  an  utterance  without  entertaining  a  thought  that  it  is  used  to express. More  carefully,  the  transparency  of  understanding  is  the  requirement that one who has uptake of the expression of a particular thought is thereby in a position to treat reasons for or against accepting the thought itself as reasons for or  against  endorsing  the  thought  registered  through  understanding.  For instance, according to transparency, one who has uptake of the expression of the thought  that Viswanathan will win  is  in a position  to  treat reasons  for denying that  Viswanathan  will  win  as  reasons  for  denying  what  they  understand  as having been expressed.  In  that way, what  is  immediately before one’s mind, by virtue  of  one’s  understanding  of  an  utterance,  is  the  (putative)  subject matter determined by the thought, rather than, for example, the thought itself being the immediate object of one’s thinking. 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 The transparency requirement is closely connected with John McDowell’s observation that our most basic engagements with what speakers say are ways of acquiring  information about  the subject matter of what  they say rather  than about  what  the  speakers  have  said  or  believe.26  It  is  weaker  than  the requirement  that  all  thoughts  be  transparently  communicable,  so  that  for  any thought  of  any  thinker,  it  is  possible  for  another  thinker  to  entertain  that thought. The latter requirement faces obvious difficulties arising from the special natures  of  certain  indexical  thoughts.27  And  it  may  be  that  similar  difficulties afflict  the  less  demanding  requirement  for  transparency  of  understanding.  In that  case,  or on other  grounds,  one might  consider  a  further weakening  to  the requirement that understanding the expression of a thought with subject matter 
P  involves  entertaining  a  thought  with  subject  matter  P.28  Further  wrinkles might then involve specification of additional conditions on the relation between expression  and  entertaining.  The  requirement  obviously  warrants  further articulation and defence, but its provisional endorsement will be harmless in the present, exploratory context.   The hypothesis derived  from Davidson’s proposal  sustains  transparency in  the  following way. We have  it  that  Florence  said  that  Viswanathan will win and  so  gave  expression  to  the  thought  that  Viswanathan  will  win.  Hence, according  to  transparency,  understanding  Florence’s  utterance  must  involve entertaining  the  thought  that  Viswanathan  will  win.  The  required  result  is secured  by  the  hypothesis  because  one  cannot  know  that  (7)  without entertaining (7), and so without entertaining a thought of its right hand side, to the effect that Viswanathan will win.29   A  first  obvious  alternative  to  the  present  hypothesis  is  that  uptake  is  a matter of knowing what was said  in an utterance—for  instance,  that uptake of what Florence said in u is a matter of knowing that what Florence said in u was that Viswanathan will win. Knowing that  is a matter of knowing which  thought Florence  expressed  rather  than  a  matter  of  entertaining  the  thought  she expressed. To see the difference, and also an aspect of  its  importance, consider that  it  is  consistent with knowing  that Florence has said  that Viswanathan will win  that  one  should  fail  to  think  in  accord  with  the  truth  conditions  of  what Florence said. For  instance,  it  is consistent with an  inability to take reasons for 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thinking  that  Viswanathan  did  not  win  as  reasons  for  thinking  that  what  one took  Florence  to  have  said  is  false.  Indeed,  it  is  consistent  with  apparently rational  refusal  to  treat what  Florence  said  as  having  truth‐conditions,  for  one might  have  apparent  grounds  for  endorsing  a  view  of  expressed  thoughts according  to which  they  do  not.30  Notice  that,  if  the  possibility  of  this  type  of block on the appreciation of reasons marks off knowledge of what was said from understanding proper,  then  it would provide an at  least partial explanation  for Peacocke’s observation that one can know what was said without understanding. The  partial  explanation would  be  that mere  knowledge,  unlike  understanding, fails  the  transparency  requirement.  Anyway,  if  we  assume  the  transparency requirement,  then  the  present  hypothesis  has  a  key  advantage  over  the  first obvious alternative.   A second, related, benefit of the hypothesis is that it ensures what I shall call  appreciation  of  the  expressive  connection  between  an  utterance  and  the thought one understands it to express. Appreciation of expressive connection is a matter of appreciating that reasons for or against what one understands to have been  expressed are  reasons  for  or  against  the  acceptability  of  the utterance  in which  it was expressed. Appreciation  is  sustained by  the hypothesis because  if one derives knowledge of (7) from knowledge of an interpretative truth‐theory covering u,  then one  is  in a position to know that  the truth‐value of u  is coeval with  the  truth‐value  of  the  thought  that  one  entertains  on  the  basis  of understanding. One  is  therefore  in a position  to derive  reasons  to  take u  to be true (/false) from reasons to believe (/deny) that Viswanathan will win and vice 
versa.31  In  this  case,  there  is  room  for  a  gap  to  open  up,  on  the  hypothesis, between uptake and its derivational exploitation, for someone might know (7) as a  theorem of an  interpretative  truth‐theory and yet have apparent grounds  for rejecting  the  derivability  of  coeval  status  for  its  right  and  left  hand  sides,  due perhaps to an idiosyncratic understanding of the bi‐conditional.32 Following the earlier  suggestion  about  Peacocke’s  observation,  the  gap  here  might  help  to explain why testimonial knowledge of truth‐conditions appears not to suffice for understanding.  But  perhaps  it  could  be  argued  that  someone  with  an idiosyncratic conception of the bi‐conditional would nonetheless be in a position 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to appreciate an expressive connection between utterance and condition, despite their not being in a position properly to exploit what they appreciate.   On the assumption that transparency is to be respected, a second obvious alternative to the present hypothesis is a view according to which uptake of what is said  in an utterance  is a matter simply of entertaining an expressed thought, without entertaining the thought on the basis of knowing a truth‐theorem for the utterance. Such a view would obviously preserve transparency, but at a cost. For someone might  entertain  the  thought  expressed  in  an utterance without,  so  to speak,  appreciating  it  as having been  expressed  in  the utterance.  In particular, one who entertained the thought expressed in an utterance might fail to occupy an  epistemic  position  in  which  reasons  to  reject  the  expressed  thought  are available to them as reasons to reject the utterance.33 Hence, the hypothesis has a key advantage over the second obvious alternative.   Although the hypothesis has important advantages over the two obvious alternatives  that we  have  considered,  it  also  suffers  from  a  critical  flaw.34  The flaw can be presented as a dilemma.    The  first  horn  of  the  dilemma  arises  from  the  demands  that  the hypothesis  imposes  upon  uptake.  In  the  first  place,  the  hypothesis  secures transparency  only  by  securing more  than  transparency  appears  to  demand.  In order to entertain the content expressed by an utterance, the proposal requires that  subjects  entertain  a  richer  content,  embedding  a  concept  of  truth.  And  it might reasonably be denied that it is a necessary condition on a subject’s having uptake  that  they  have,  or  are  required  to  exercise  in  uptake,  facility  with  a concept of truth.35 Moreover,  in the second place, the proposal, as presented,  is yet more demanding on subjects, since it requires subjects to appreciate that the truth‐theorems  that  they  apply  to  particular  utterances  are  elements  in  an interpretative truth‐theory. Again, it might reasonably be doubted that uptake in general depends upon the sort of reflective assurance provided by knowledge of the interpretative status of a truth‐theorem applying to a particular utterance.36 The first horn of the dilemma, then, is the claim that, as presented, the proposal is implausibly demanding of the capacities, and exercises of capacities, involved in uptake. 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 On  the  second horn of  the dilemma  is  the  claim  that  the  features of  the hypothesis  found problematic on the  first horn are not optional. Obviously,  the core  component  of  the  proposal,  that  transparency  and  appreciation  of expressive connection involve knowledge of truth‐theorems, cannot be shorn of its apparently extraneous element, that it makes uptake depend upon exercise of a  concept  of  truth.  And  the  hypothesis  secures  appreciation  of  expressive connection  only  by  requiring,  not  only  that  subjects  know  truth‐theorems applying to particular utterances, but also that they know that the theorems are elements  in  an  interpretative  truth‐theory.  Someone  who  knew  only  the  bi‐conditional  theorems, without  also  knowing  their  pedigree,  would  not  be  in  a position  to  treat  reasons  for  rejecting  (/accepting)  one  side  of  a  theorem  as reasons  for  rejecting  (/accepting)  the  other.  For  example,  someone  in  that position  might  view  reasons  for  rejecting  either  side  of  the  bi‐conditional  as reasons for rejecting the bi‐conditional itself.37 The second horn of the dilemma, then,  involves  a  version  of  John  Foster’s  infamous  objection  to  Davidson’s proposal,  according  to  which  knowledge  of  what  is  in  fact  an  interpretative truth‐theorem  covering  an  utterance  does  not  suffice  for  appreciation  of  the utterance’s expression of content.38    On  the  assumption  that  the  hypothesis  is  too  demanding  to  supply  a necessary condition on uptake,  the requirements that we have discerned on an adequate  account  of  uptake might  appear  to  be  impossible  to meet.  That  is,  it might appear impossible to provide an account that  is  less demanding than the hypothesis,  and  yet  able  to  ensure  both  transparency  and  appreciation  of expressive  connection.  And  in  that  case,  one might  be  inclined  either  to  reject one  of  the  requirements,  or  to  take  their  conjunction  to  sustain  a  sort  of transcendental  argument  to  the  effect  that  the  demands  imposed  by  the hypothesis  are  appropriate.  However, we  signalled  at  the  outset  an  additional feature  of  the hypothesis  that  is  not  obviously  a mandatory  component  of  any account of uptake: the requirement that an account of uptake take the form of an account of the content of propositional knowledge. We considered, and rejected, one  alternative  hypothesis  that  involves  rejection  of  the  view,  the  hypothesis that uptake is a matter simply of entertaining an expressed thought. But having 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made the requirement explicit, it is clear that there are further alternatives to be explored before we accede to one of the hypotheses we have already considered.   One important alternative, defended in recent work by Ian Rumfitt, gives up the view in favour of a treatment of uptake as constituting, not propositional knowledge about utterances, but rather, as he puts it,  …a  second‐order  cognitive  capacity:  [in  the  case  of  uptake  of  assertion‐like sayings]  one who  possesses  it  is  in  a  capacity  to  gain  new  knowledge  from  old (Rumfitt, 2005: 444).39  Specifically,   My  understanding  an  utterance u  as  [assertion‐like]  saying  that P  puts me  in  a position   (a) to know that P, in the event of my coming to know that u is true; (b) to know that u is true, in the event of my coming to know that P; (c) to know that u is false, in the event of my coming to know that not P; and (d) to know that not P, in the event of my coming to know that u is false.  Understanding  a[n  assertion‐like]  saying,  in  other  words,  allows  knowledge  to spread back and forth between the saying’s content and attributions of truth to it, and  between  that  content’s  negation  and  attributions  of  falsity  to  the  saying (Rumfitt, 2005: 443).40  Rumfitt’s proposal has  two main advantages over  the  truth‐theoretic proposal. First, Rumfitt’s proposal directly sustains appreciation of expressive connection, rather than running a dogleg through propositional knowledge of interpretative truth  theorems.  Or,  rather,  his  proposal  makes  a  single  requirement  on understanding  do  the  work  we  earlier  divided  between  transparency  and appreciation  of  expressive  connection.  Second,  and  closely  related,  the  type  of appreciation  involved  in  understanding  is,  on  Rumfitt’s  account,  sufficiently demanding  that  it  apparently  removes  the  need  for  the  sort  of  reflective assurance  of  appreciation  of  expressive  connection  supplied,  on  the  truth‐
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theoretic proposal, by knowledge of the interpretative status of theorems. Both advantages  appear  to  be  consequent  upon  the  transition  to  a  view  of understanding  as  involving  second‐order  capacities  together  with  a  very demanding conception of the epistemic standing of those capacities.   At this point, a natural question about Rumfitt’s proposal concerns intake. What account of  intake would serve the proposal,  in particular  in underwriting someone’s coming to be in the type of epistemic position characterised through (a)–(d)?  Even  setting  aside  the  sorts  of  issues  arising  from  the  finitude  of  our capacities  that  give  rise  to  a  concern with  compositionality,  it  is  not  plausible that we simply bring to bear on utterances prior knowledge of the sort described in  (a)–(d).  At  best,  we  might  have  such  knowledge  about  the  sentence  types instanced  in  particular  utterances.  And  that  appears  to  be  the model  to which Rumfitt  wishes  to  appeal  in  accounting  for  the  onset  of  the  understanding  of particular utterances. Rumfitt describes appreciation of  the connections  in (a)–(d) as akin to knowledge of derived rules of inference, in this case as capacities derived from capacities with respect to rules governing the contribution of sub‐sentential  expressions  to  sentential  level  rules.41 What  is  required  of  intake  in such a context  is that  it should afford knowledge about which expression types are  instanced  in  a  particular  utterance.  In  effect,  (a)–(d)  are  to  be  viewed  as derived  from  a  combination  of  analogues  for  (a)–(d),  or  their  derivational sources,  governing  expression  types,  rather  than  utterances,  together  with subjects’  competent  exercise  of  abilities  to  recognise  the  instancing  of  those expression types in particular utterances. It is therefore plausible that the second component—the  exercises  of  abilities  to  recognise  the  instancing  of  sentence types—provides  Rumfitt’s  account  of  intake,  his  account  of  the  onset  of understanding of particular utterances.    Although  Rumfitt  does  not  explicitly  endorse  the  view  of  intake  as recognition of the instancing of sentence types, it is the view apparently most in accord  with  the  derivational  shape  of  his  proposal.  And  the  appearance  is sustained by the fact that he provides an explicit account of the recognition of the instancing  of  sentence  types.  According  to  that  account,  recognition  of  the instancing of sentence types is a matter of appreciating the intentions with which speakers  make  some  of  the  noises  that  they  do,  where  the  relevant  range  of 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intentions  are  intentions  to  be  recognised  as  having  produced  an  utterance instancing one or another specific type of sentence.42   Rumfitt’s  proposal  deserves  more  discussion  than  I  can  afford  it  here. Indeed,  I  think  that  its  core,  or  something  close  to  that  core,  can  provide  an account  of  uptake  that  is  quite  plausible.  I  shall  simply note  and  set  aside  one difficulty and then all too briefly press a second.    The difficulty that I wish simply to note is that, as stated, the proposal is more  or  less  as  demanding  of  conceptual  resources  as  the  truth‐theoretic account it is designed to surpass.43 For on the assumption that being in a position to  know  that  an utterance  is  true  or  false  demands possession of  a  concept  of truth  or  falsity,  understanding  will,  on  Rumfitt’s  account,  often  depend  upon possession of those concepts. Moreover, attainment of utterance understanding requires,  on  Rumfitt’s  proposal,  the  manipulation  of  rich  theoretical machinery—albeit  a machinery,  not  of  propositions,  but  rather  of  connections amongst  propositions. However, what  is  central  to  the  proposal  is  that  uptake opens  a  conduit  for  the  transmission  of  reasons,  however  those  reasons  are characterised,  and  however  precisely  the  conduit  is  opened.  And  it  is  not implausible  to  suppose  that  the  types  of  reasons  available  to  a  subject  will impact upon the type of connections amongst reasons accessible to the subject. If that is right, then it is plausible that more minimal analogues of (a)–(d) might be provided  to  characterise  the understanding of  subjects who  lack  facility with a concept of truth.44 And the concern about the derivational machinery that must be manipulated  in order  to achieve understanding  is  readily absorbed  into  the following difficulty.   The  difficulty  that  I  wish  to  press  concerns  the  interaction  between Rumfitt’s  account  of  uptake  and  what  appears  to  be  his  favoured  account  of intake. In the first place, notice that neither Rumfitt’s account of  intake, nor his account of uptake, sustains transparency. For one might be  in  the position that Rumfitt describes as understanding and yet have no view at all about any of the reasons that one’s understanding connects. In that case, one might understand u without  entertaining  a  thought  that  u  expresses.  As  noted,  Rumfitt  in  effect collapses  transparency  and  appreciation  of  expressive  connection  into appreciation  of  (a)–(d).  Accordingly,  one’s  occurrent  understanding  of  an 
  24 
utterance  need  have  no  impact  upon  one’s  first‐order  psychology  aside  from one’s  recognition  of  the  instancing  of  sentences  by  utterances.  That  result anyway  appears  phenomenologically  off‐key.  But  in  the  present  context,  it  is especially  problematic.  For  despite  one’s  initial  failure  to  entertain  a  thought expressed  by  an  utterance,  acquiring  knowledge  that  the  utterance  is  true immediately puts one in a position to entertain that thought through acquisition of knowledge with the expressed thought as content. It is as if one engages with the  thought  expressed  by  an  utterance  only  when,  in  addition  simply  to understanding the utterance, one also acquires reason to endorse or to reject it.45   That  indicates  an  oddity  of  the  proposal,  though  perhaps  not  yet  an objection.  An  objection  comes  into  view  when  one  reflects  further  on  the embedded account of intake. What is required is an account of what puts one in a position  to  secure  uptake,  so  what  enables  one  to  appreciate  the  connections specified in (a)–(d). According to the account of intake that fits most comfortably with the derivational shape of Rumfitt’s proposal, what puts one in that position is  a  combination of  (i) one’s  recognition  that  the  speaker  is  trying  to direct  an instance of a sentence type at one and one’s knowledge of which sentence type the  speaker  is  trying  to direct  at  one46  and  (ii)  one’s derivation of  a  sentential analogue  of  the  type  of  second‐order  capacity  characterised  through  (a)–(d) appropriate  to  the  intended  sentence  type. The oddity  remarked above  turned on the fact that this proposal appears to involve less than is involved in ordinary understanding of utterances. But the proposal also seems to involve more than is involved  in  ordinary  engagement with  utterances.  For  it  is  not merely  off‐key, but  false,  to  claim  that  speakers  typically  have  sufficiently  detailed  intentions concerning the types of expressions that they use to serve as appropriate input to the type of derivation that Rumfitt envisages. What speakers typically intend is simply to say that such‐and‐such, and perhaps to be understood in accord with their  intentions, without prejudice  as  to  the  specific  linguistic means by which they  achieve  those  ends.  And  competent  auditors  are  typically  able  to understand  utterances  despite  failing  to  recognise  the  details  either  of expression‐directed  intentions,  or  the  specifics  of  the  expression  types  with which they are confronted.47 
  25 
  What is, perhaps, the most pressing difficulty for Rumfitt’s proposal arises from the burden imposed on uptake as a consequence of the account of intake as recognition  of  the  instancing  of  sentence  types.  The  reason‐connections discerned  through  uptake,  between  sentence  types,  or  their  instancing  in utterances,  and  thoughts,  are  contingent:  the  sentence  types  could  have  been reason‐connected with different thoughts. And it is difficult to see how epistemic standing with respect to such a structure could be acquired except via something akin to induction from cases—in this case, induction over cases in which one was in a position to know both P (/not P) and that u is true (/false). But in that case, it is  not  clear  that  being  in  an  epistemic  position,  so  derived,  would  differ  in significant respects from the position of someone who knew, on similar inductive grounds, an appropriate truth theorem. In particular, it is not clear that induction could put one in a position to treat knowledge that P as putting one in a position to know that u is true, rather than as putting one in a position to know that either 




 The  foregoing  constitutes  a  preliminary  exploration  of  some  issues  that  arise when an attempt is made to develop an account of linguistic understanding. The upshot is not yet an account of understanding, even in sketch form. But I believe that many of the pieces required to develop at least a sketch are now in place. In particular,  I  believe  that  an  account  of  uptake  close  to  the  core  of  Rumfitt’s proposal may be correct. What is required is a way of integrating that core with an adequate account of intake. I shan’t attempt to make good on that suggestion now. As  I  said at  the start, my aim here  is  to make a mild plea  for attention  to understanding, by advertising some major targets for reflection. And it would be inappropriate, given that aim, to render further attention superfluous. 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1  Thanks  for  very  helpful  discussion  to  Bill  Brewer,  Stephen  Butterfill,  Naomi Eilan,  Christoph Hoerl,  Hemdat  Lerman,  Johannes  Roessler,  Sarah  Sawyer,  and especially Matthew Soteriou. This paper  is dedicated  to  the memory of Nadine Sheldon Green. 2  Dummett  rarely  frames  the  claim  in  the  strong  form  according  to  which  a theory of meaning  should be  a  theory of  understanding. His  discussions of  the claim  invariably  are  shaped  by  the  question  of  proper  integration  of  theories, rather than the identity of their targets, and are highly sensitive to the difficulty of  adequately  specifying  the  integration  requirement.  See  e.g.  Dummett,  1981, 1991. For general discussion of the integration requirement, see Smith, 1992. 3 See e.g. Moore, 1989. The issues here are close relatives of questions about the integration  of  knowledge  and  fact  pursued  by  Peacocke,  1999,  and  questions about their separability pursued by Fine, 2005. 4 The question whether Wittgenstein refused to recognise an occurrent sense of ‘understand’ is answered negatively in McDowell, 2009. 5  The  need  for  an  additional  and  less  demanding  notion  of  what  is  said  is defended in Travis, 2006. 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6 In addition, one might need to discern, not only the referents of the unspecified subject  of  ‘expect’  and  the  anaphoric  object  of  ‘beat’,  but  also  the  specific contents of ‘too’, ‘intelligent’, ‘expect’, and ‘beat’. See e.g. Travis, 1997. 7 See Martin, 2002, for discussion of related issues. 8 ‘Occasioned’ might be an improvement on ‘occurrent’ in such contexts. 9 Consistently with my understanding of what it takes for something to be a state, I needn’t take issue with Rundle, 2001, and Baker and Hacker, 2005, who argue that  what  we  have  labelled  ‘occurrent  understanding’  is  itself  a  form  of disposition or ability. Although Rundle and Baker and Hacker take themselves to be  in  dispute  with  Dummett  with  regard  to  this  claim  about  occurrent understanding, it is not clear that Dummett either takes, or needs to take, a stand on the issue in the discussion that they target. And that would be so even on the episodic understanding of  ‘occurrent’,  for the onset of a disposition or ability is an episode. 10  For  a  discussion  and  defence  of  this  view  of  basic  a  priori  knowledge,  see McFetridge, 1990. 11 Burge, 1993, 1997, 1998, 1999. 12  Longworth,  2008b.  One  reason  for  the  qualification  ‘in  any  straightforward way’ is that my disagreement with Burge concerns only the status of core cases of  human  occurrent  understanding.  And  it  is  consistent  with  the  a  posteriori status  of  occurrent  understanding  that  it  can  sustain  acquisition  (or transmission)  of a  priori  knowledge  via  testimony,  so  that  it  is  open  to me  to endorse Burge’s further claim that such acquisition (or transmission) is possible. If  it  is  possible,  and  if  it  also  possible  for  beings  other  than  us—e.g.  infinite beings—to have a priori knowledge of what  is said,  then  it may be possible  for humans to acquire from such beings a priori knowledge of what is said. 13 Peacocke, 1976. See also Fricker, 2003. 14 See e.g. Williamson, 2000. 15 See Hunter, 1998; Longworth, 2008a. 16  It  is  plausible  to  view  the  possibility  of  rational  withholding  of  belief  as marking  a  line between  a  kind of  receptivity  and  a  kind of  spontaneity, where that line marks a boundary around the domain of cognition for which a subject is 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responsible. Since one has at best limited control over what one takes in through understanding or sense perception, and since the capacities that sub‐serve that intake  are  fallible,  allowing  intake  to  encroach  on  the  domain  of  spontaneity would  have  the  potential  to  make  one  responsible  for  errors  without  one’s control. 17 For discussion and defence of this view of a function of knowledge in rational psychology, as an enabling condition for the exploitation of  factive reasons, see Dancy, 2000, 2008; Hornsby, 2008; Hyman, 1999, 2006; McDowell, 1982, 1994, 1995; Williamson, 2000. 18 It may be that this condition applies only to creatures with a capacity to have propositional knowledge, or even creatures with a capacity to know of the sort possessed  by  normal  humans.  Perhaps,  for  example,  knowledge  would  not  be required to play this role in creatures with a perception‐desire psychology. 19 See e.g. Davidson, 1984: 125, 1986. 20  Indeed,  our  formulation  is  consistent  with  the  required  epistemic  standing being  content‐less,  as  it  would  be,  on  some  views,  if  it  were  a  form  of  purely practical knowledge. See especially Moore, 1997. For more general discussion of the  content  of  knowledge‐how  and  practical  knowledge  see  Rumfitt,  2003; Snowdon, 2003; Stanley and Williamson, 2001. 21 Davidson, 1984. 22 Thanks to Matthew Soteriou for reminding me about Dummett’s observation and for helpful discussion of it. 23  Some  speakers will  find  acceptable  ‘supposing’,  ‘believing’,  etc.,  but without according them a construal distinct from ‘supposes’, ‘believes’, etc. 24  The  closest  relevant  process  in  the  case  of  supposition would  be  reasoning under the supposition. 25 Here and throughout I use ‘entertaining’ as a generic, or determinable, for all specific,  or  determinate,  ways  of  engaging  with  a  thought,  including  thinking, believing,  knowing,  etc.  And  I  shall  assume  that  entertaining  logically  complex thoughts entails entertaining their elementary component thoughts, so that,  for example, entertaining the thought that if Viswanathan will win, then he will not 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be  disqualified,  entails  entertaining  the  thought  that  Viswanathan  will  not  be disqualified. 26 See McDowell, 1980. For related discussion, see Burge, 1999; Hornsby, 1989; McDowell, 2005.  27  See  e.g.  Dummett,  1981;  Frege,  1918/1956;  Higginbotham,  2002;  Peacocke, 1981, 1997. 28 Two other potential grounds: (i) Transparency embodies a controversial stand on the question whether understanding an utterance requires engaging a specific thought  expressed  by  the  utterance,  rather  than  a  thought  with  the  same reference as  the utterance;  (ii)  It  is  impossible  transparently  to understand an utterance  involving  the  expression  of  expletive  concepts,  or  thick  ethical concepts, that one cannot, or will not, think with. 29  Transparency  is  lost  on  some  formulations  of  Davidson’s  proposal.  For instance,  one  of  Davidson’s  formulations  has  it  that  ‘what  somebody  needs  to know  is  that  some  T­theory  for  L  states  that  …  (and  here  the  dots  are  to  be replaced by a T‐theory)’ (Davidson, 1976: 174). If that were all somebody knew, then  their knowledge would not amount  to entertaining  the  thought expressed by a target utterance. An improved formulation would add the requirement that somebody  must  know  that  …  (and  here  the  dots  are  to  be  replaced  by  the appropriate theorem of a T­theory). 30 See e.g. McFarlane, 2003. 31 This  is  to  run  together  two aspects  of  the  situation  that might  otherwise be distinguished:  (i) appreciation  that u  is  true  iff  the  thought one understands  to have been expressed, P,  is  true and (ii) appreciation, via  transparency,  that  the thought one understands to have been expressed, P, is true iff P. 32 For example, one might have apparently reasonable grounds for rejecting the general validity of modus ponens. See e.g. McGee, 1985, and for related discussion Williamson, 2003. 33  The  concern  here  is  akin  to  that  raised  earlier  about  Burge’s  account  of understanding.  A  version  of  the  concern  is  developed  in  more  detail  in Longworth, 2008b. 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34 To reiterate, these are not disadvantages of Davidson’s proposal per se, for that proposal  concerns  the  metaphysics  of  the  expression  of  content  and  not  our modes of access to the expression of content. 35 A central case for doubt about the necessity even of facility with a concept of truth  derives  from  reflection  on  the  apparent  possibility  of  uptake  by  small children who plausibly lack facility with such a concept. See Soames, 1989, 2008; Longworth, 2008a. 36 Cf. Higginbotham, 1992. 37  The  most  obvious  case  would  be  one  in  which  a  subject  knew  the  bi‐conditional on the basis of knowing the truth of both sides of the bi‐conditional. 38 See Foster, 1976. See also Davidson, 1976; Higginbotham, 1992; Rumfitt, 1995; Soames, 1989, 2008; Wiggins, 1992. 39  See  also Moore’s  proposal  that  understanding  is  (in  general)  ‘knowledge  of how to process knowledge’ (Moore, 1997: 189). 40 See also Rumfitt 1995, 2001. 41 Rumfitt, 2005: 449–451. 42 Rumfitt, 2005: 433–437. 43 Rumfitt is under no illusion about this: 445. 44 One  suggestion here would be  that  analogues of  (a)–(d) might be  framed  in terms of a capacity to exploit connections amongst acceptance (/rejection) of P and trust (/distrust) in u. 45 Compare the earlier discussion of the residue of withholding belief in what one takes  in  through  understanding.  On  Rumfitt’s  view,  the  residue  would  be exhausted by awareness of the instancing of sentence types in utterances. 46 Rumfitt, 2005: 435. 47  For  instance,  it  is  unlikely  that  you  are now  in  a position  to  reconstruct  the sentence to which this note is appended, despite (I hope) having understood my use of that sentence. See Burge, 1999; Hornsby, 2005. 48  Alternatively,  if  one  views  the  connections  between  sentence  types  and thoughts as non‐contingent, the burden will shift to explaining recognition of the instancing of sentence types so construed, that is to the derivation of (a)–(d) on the basis of knowledge of their non‐contingent sentential analogues. Notice that 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one 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simplifying assumption that the 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 made  available  to  one  through  understanding  concern utterances,  rather  than  thing  done  by  speakers.  For  it  then  becomes  apparent just how contingent the reason‐connections are, and how little evidence that the connections  hold  is  typically  available  to  ordinary  auditors.  For  discussion  of issues in this area, see Burge, 1999; McDowell, 1994. 49  The  trade‐off  between  austerity  of  intake  and  extravagance  of  resources required  for uptake bears  comparison with  a  similar  situation  in  the  theory of perception.  Consider,  for  example,  the  demands  imposed  on  one’s  ability  to attain propositional knowledge about ordinary objects by a sense‐data account of sensory intake.   
